diff --git a/.grub2.checksum b/.grub2.checksum
index 31ba3ffee31a741e30a35411bb5185fff1fd636e..b9dea276c6bd3de072c7075da97303cf0cbb6e86 100644
--- a/.grub2.checksum
+++ b/.grub2.checksum
@@ -1 +1 @@
-8d7f5f4b18a7c50b2a4258333f144052f33f9a0502e1da1efd21f497f94074e3
+3db8b43cf3de02cfb5fd1367f2f19d27b266b35ba8066711586892d94c3eb46a
diff --git a/.grub2.metadata b/.grub2.metadata
index 1cf5135b8ac9235094c02ba39ba062687b2b2d6e..64297fad0e26f79a51a3403a1d70a19dfa204f46 100644
--- a/.grub2.metadata
+++ b/.grub2.metadata
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
+810b3798d316394f94096ec2797909dbf23c858e48f7b3830826b8daa06b7b0f SOURCES/grub-2.02.tar.xz
+224f7059328df355810fee105e79af2e9fc7e520504f9f545c08ca4e32e8c200 SOURCES/redhatsecureboot301.cer
+3f564ef41227562f9ea45c3fd8f96bea9ab8205247ef72dd025fdcd728373a00 SOURCES/redhatsecureboot502.cer
+8f435a96261e571ed557f9243e7fe7db5b93bc8f7eefcfc5b0c154d5d29292fb SOURCES/redhatsecureboot601.cer
c6d43c94bcbc73c81df3026bc201a88886b8ceebe98188cdb69bdd61bd6be287 SOURCES/redhatsecureboot701.cer
9996c73616ee42f13396c9abfb4b646b538c3c80940474b710afdbe53bf17d32 SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca3.cer
-810b3798d316394f94096ec2797909dbf23c858e48f7b3830826b8daa06b7b0f SOURCES/grub-2.02.tar.xz
40175d4c7c5ab4bd753a493f47952f1d8dcf1c219b836968a693e48bd4766135 SOURCES/redhatsecurebootca5.cer
1fddd06b4854598a18ff3742c472c6a5c609929ce1ab74ec9901812aaf30be02 SOURCES/theme.tar.bz2
122b9c470f29b70223b0e07404a6dfa7f339fcfa6ae74c024f478945af7a9a63 SOURCES/unifont-5.1.20080820.pcf.gz
-224f7059328df355810fee105e79af2e9fc7e520504f9f545c08ca4e32e8c200 SOURCES/redhatsecureboot301.cer
-3f564ef41227562f9ea45c3fd8f96bea9ab8205247ef72dd025fdcd728373a00 SOURCES/redhatsecureboot502.cer
-8f435a96261e571ed557f9243e7fe7db5b93bc8f7eefcfc5b0c154d5d29292fb SOURCES/redhatsecureboot601.cer
diff --git a/SOURCES/0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch b/SOURCES/0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4895dd1b35c55605de98bc0130897f033991d5a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 8c74431327e0c7d7fe47462b0e69fcbe3bbac56e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 24 Mar 2023 09:14:29 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] Regenerate kernelopts if missing on ppc
+
+Signed-off-by: Marta Lewandowska <mlewando@redhat.com>
+---
+ util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in b/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
+index 855dbdd..f2281bc 100644
+--- a/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
++++ b/util/grub.d/10_linux_bls.in
+@@ -117,6 +117,18 @@ cat <<EOF
+ # This section was generated by a script. Do not modify the generated file - all changes
+ # will be lost the next time file is regenerated. Instead edit the BootLoaderSpec files.
+
++# The kernelopts variable should be defined in the grubenv file. But to ensure that menu
++# entries populated from BootLoaderSpec files that use this variable work correctly even
++# without a grubenv file, define a fallback kernelopts variable if this has not been set.
++#
++# The kernelopts variable in the grubenv file can be modified using the grubby tool or by
++# executing the grub2-mkconfig tool. For the latter, the values of the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX
++# and GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT options from /etc/default/grub file are used to set both
++# the kernelopts variable in the grubenv file and the fallback kernelopts variable.
++if [ -z "\${kernelopts}" ]; then
++ set kernelopts="root=${linux_root_device_thisversion} ro ${args}"
++fi
++
+ EOF
+ }
+
+--
+2.39.1
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch b/SOURCES/0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..27ac2784ff162f46bedacf47c41a2e5a1cab17be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue, 8 Aug 2023 12:21:55 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] kern/ieee1275/init: ppc64: Restrict high memory in presence
+ of fadump
+
+This is a backport of the patch with the same name to grub 2.02.
+
+When a kernel dump is present then restrict the high memory regions to
+avoid allocating memory where the kernel dump resides. Use the
+ibm,kernel-dump node under /rtas to determine whether a kernel dump exists
+and up to which limit grub can use available memory. Set the
+upper_mem_limit to the size of the kernel dump section of type
+'REAL_MODE_REGION' and therefore only allow grub's memory usage for high
+addresses from 768MB to 'upper_mem_limit'. This means that grub can
+use high memory in the range of 768MB to upper_mem_limit and
+the kernel-dump memory regions above 'upper_mem_limit' remain untouched.
+This change has no effect on memory allocations below 640MB.
+
+Also, fall back to allocating below 640MB in case the chunk of
+memory there would be larger than the chunk of memory above 768MB.
+This can for example occur if a free memory area is found starting at 300MB
+extending up to 1GB but a kernel dump is located at 768MB and therefore
+does not allow the allocation of the high memory area but requiring to use
+the chunk starting at 300MB to avoid an unnecessary out-of-memory
+condition.
+
+Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
+Cc: Pavithra Prakash <pavrampu@in.ibm.com>
+Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
+Cc: Carolyn Scherrer <cpscherr@us.ibm.com>
+Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.ibm.com>
+Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 139 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+index 1fae84440403..31843ab70a62 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c
+@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
+ * along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
++#include <stddef.h> /* offsetof() */
++
+ #include <grub/kernel.h>
+ #include <grub/dl.h>
+ #include <grub/disk.h>
+@@ -180,6 +182,97 @@ grub_claim_heap (void)
+ + GRUB_KERNEL_MACHINE_STACK_SIZE), 0x200000);
+ }
+ #else
++
++/* ibm,kernel-dump data structures */
++struct kd_section
++{
++ grub_uint32_t flags;
++ grub_uint16_t src_datatype;
++#define KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION 0x0011
++ grub_uint16_t error_flags;
++ grub_uint64_t src_address;
++ grub_uint64_t num_bytes;
++ grub_uint64_t act_bytes;
++ grub_uint64_t dst_address;
++} GRUB_PACKED;
++
++#define MAX_KD_SECTIONS 10
++
++struct kernel_dump
++{
++ grub_uint32_t format;
++ grub_uint16_t num_sections;
++ grub_uint16_t status_flags;
++ grub_uint32_t offset_1st_section;
++ grub_uint32_t num_blocks;
++ grub_uint64_t start_block;
++ grub_uint64_t num_blocks_avail;
++ grub_uint32_t offet_path_string;
++ grub_uint32_t max_time_allowed;
++ struct kd_section kds[MAX_KD_SECTIONS]; /* offset_1st_section should point to kds[0] */
++} GRUB_PACKED;
++
++/*
++ * Determine if a kernel dump exists and if it does, then determine the highest
++ * address that grub can use for memory allocations.
++ * The caller must have initialized *highest to ~0. *highest will not
++ * be modified if no kernel dump is found.
++ */
++static int
++check_kernel_dump (grub_uint64_t *highest)
++{
++ struct kernel_dump kernel_dump;
++ grub_ssize_t kernel_dump_size;
++ grub_ieee1275_phandle_t rtas;
++ struct kd_section *kds;
++ grub_size_t i;
++
++ /* If there's a kernel-dump it must have at least one section */
++ if (grub_ieee1275_finddevice ("/rtas", &rtas) ||
++ grub_ieee1275_get_property (rtas, "ibm,kernel-dump", &kernel_dump,
++ sizeof (kernel_dump), &kernel_dump_size) ||
++ kernel_dump_size <= (grub_ssize_t) offsetof (struct kernel_dump, kds[1]))
++ return 0;
++
++ kernel_dump_size = grub_min (kernel_dump_size, (grub_ssize_t) sizeof (kernel_dump));
++
++ if (grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format) != 1)
++ {
++ grub_printf (_("Error: ibm,kernel-dump has an unexpected format version '%u'\n"),
++ grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.format));
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if (grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections) > MAX_KD_SECTIONS)
++ {
++ grub_printf (_("Error: Too many kernel dump sections: %d\n"),
++ grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.num_sections));
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ for (i = 0; i < grub_be_to_cpu16 (kernel_dump.num_sections); i++)
++ {
++ kds = (struct kd_section *) ((grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump +
++ grub_be_to_cpu32 (kernel_dump.offset_1st_section) +
++ i * sizeof (struct kd_section));
++ /* sanity check the address is within the 'kernel_dump' struct */
++ if ((grub_addr_t) kds > (grub_addr_t) &kernel_dump + kernel_dump_size + sizeof (*kds))
++ {
++ grub_printf (_("Error: 'kds' address beyond last available section\n"));
++ return 0;
++ }
++
++ if ((grub_be_to_cpu16 (kds->src_datatype) == KD_SRC_DATATYPE_REAL_MODE_REGION) &&
++ (grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->src_address) == 0))
++ {
++ *highest = grub_min (*highest, grub_be_to_cpu64 (kds->num_bytes));
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++
++ return 1;
++}
++
+ /* Helper for grub_claim_heap on powerpc. */
+ static int
+ heap_size (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
+@@ -207,7 +300,9 @@ static int
+ heap_init (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
+ void *data)
+ {
++ grub_uint64_t upper_mem_limit = ~0;
+ grub_uint32_t total = *(grub_uint32_t *)data;
++ int has_kernel_dump;
+
+ if (type != GRUB_MEMORY_AVAILABLE)
+ return 0;
+@@ -243,6 +338,50 @@ heap_init (grub_uint64_t addr, grub_uint64_t len, grub_memory_type_t type,
+ len = 0;
+ }
+
++ has_kernel_dump = check_kernel_dump (&upper_mem_limit);
++ if (has_kernel_dump)
++ {
++ grub_uint64_t lo_len = 0, hi_len = 0;
++
++ if (addr > upper_mem_limit || upper_mem_limit == (grub_uint64_t)~0)
++ return 0;
++
++ /* limit len to stay below upper_mem_limit */
++ if (addr < upper_mem_limit && (addr + len) > upper_mem_limit)
++ {
++ len = grub_min (len, upper_mem_limit - addr);
++ }
++
++ /* We can allocate below 640MB or above 768MB.
++ * Choose the bigger chunk below 640MB or above 768MB.
++ */
++ if (addr < 0x28000000)
++ {
++ lo_len = grub_min (len, 0x28000000 - addr);
++ }
++ if (addr + len > 0x30000000)
++ {
++ if (addr < 0x30000000)
++ hi_len = len - (0x30000000 - addr);
++ else
++ hi_len = len;
++ }
++
++ if (hi_len > lo_len)
++ {
++ len = hi_len;
++ if (addr < 0x30000000)
++ addr = 0x30000000;
++ }
++ else
++ {
++ len = lo_len;
++ }
++
++ if (len == 0)
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ /* If this block contains 0x30000000 (768MB), do not claim below that.
+ Linux likes to claim memory at min(RMO top, 768MB) and works down
+ without reference to /memory/available. */
diff --git a/SOURCES/0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch b/SOURCES/0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..64c5def3259d3ceccf213e81af3f1aa94564fc4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 May 2023 11:22:47 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] util: Enable default kernel for updates
+
+Several kernel variants can be installed on a system in parallel.
+In order to allow the user to choose which kernel will be set to
+default after an update, re-enable grub's usage of DEFAULTKERNEL as
+set in /etc/sysconfig/kernel
+
+Signed-off-by: Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com>
+---
+ util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in b/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
+index 7e87dfccc0e4..f71bc64360b0 100644
+--- a/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
++++ b/util/grub-get-kernel-settings.in
+@@ -68,6 +68,14 @@ if test -f /etc/sysconfig/kernel ; then
+ . /etc/sysconfig/kernel
+ fi
+
++GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=${DEFAULTKERNEL/-core/}
++if [ "$GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE" != "kernel" ]; then
++ echo GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL=true
++ echo export GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL
++ GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=${GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE/kernel-/}
++fi
++echo GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE=$GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE
++echo export GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE
+ if [ "$MAKEDEBUG" = "yes" ]; then
+ echo GRUB_LINUX_MAKE_DEBUG=true
+ echo export GRUB_LINUX_MAKE_DEBUG
diff --git a/SOURCES/0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch b/SOURCES/0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ca9d396973301016d6a575a86144aca180da1835
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+From 9ca4c3fe1c7dbd62e8ad6a23cb1b1fda695fdb44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:39:41 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] grub-set-bootflag: Conservative partial fix for
+ CVE-2024-1048
+
+Following up on CVE-2019-14865 and taking a fresh look at
+grub2-set-bootflag now (through my work at CIQ on Rocky Linux), I saw some
+other ways in which users could still abuse this little program:
+
+1. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag no longer rewrites the
+grubenv file in-place, but writes into a temporary file and renames it
+over the original, checking for error returns from each call first.
+This prevents the original file truncation vulnerability, but it can
+leave the temporary file around if the program is killed before it can
+rename or remove the file. There are still many ways to get the program
+killed, such as through RLIMIT_FSIZE triggering SIGXFSZ (tested,
+reliable) or by careful timing (tricky) of signals sent by process group
+leader, pty, pre-scheduled timers, SIGXCPU (probably not an exhaustive
+list). Invoking the program multiple times fills up /boot (or if /boot
+is not separate, then it can fill up the root filesystem). Since the
+files are tiny, the filesystem is likely to run out of free inodes
+before it'd run out of blocks, but the effect is similar - can't create
+new files after this point (but still can add data to existing files,
+such as logs).
+
+2. After CVE-2019-14865 fix, grub2-set-bootflag naively tries to protect
+itself from signals by becoming full root. (This does protect it from
+signals sent by the user directly to the PID, but e.g. "kill -9 -1" by
+the user still works.) A side effect of such "protection" is that it's
+possible to invoke more concurrent instances of grub2-set-bootflag than
+the user's RLIMIT_NPROC would normally permit (as specified e.g. in
+/etc/security/limits.conf, or say in Apache httpd's RLimitNPROC if
+grub2-set-bootflag would be abused by a website script), thereby
+exhausting system resources (e.g., bypassing RAM usage limit if
+RLIMIT_AS was also set).
+
+3. umask is inherited. Again, due to how the CVE-2019-14865 fix creates
+a new file, and due to how mkstemp() works, this affects grubenv's new
+file permissions. Luckily, mkstemp() forces them to be no more relaxed
+than 0600, but the user ends up being able to set them e.g. to 0.
+Luckily, at least in my testing GRUB still works fine even when the file
+has such (lack of) permissions.
+
+This commit deals with the abuses above as follows:
+
+1. RLIMIT_FSIZE is pre-checked, so this specific way to get the process
+killed should no longer work. However, this isn't a complete fix
+because there are other ways to get the process killed after it has
+created the temporary file.
+
+The commit also fixes bug 1975892 ("RFE: grub2-set-bootflag should not
+write the grubenv when the flag being written is already set") and
+similar for "menu_show_once", which further reduces the abuse potential.
+
+2. RLIMIT_NPROC bypass should be avoided by not becoming full root (aka
+dropping the partial "kill protection").
+
+3. A safe umask is set.
+
+This is a partial fix (temporary files can still accumulate, but this is
+harder to trigger).
+
+While at it, this commit also fixes potential 1- or 2-byte over-read of
+env[] if its content is malformed - this was not a security issue since the
+grubenv file is trusted input, and the fix is just for robustness.
+
+Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+---
+ util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+index a85f11fceacb..5b932f76b6f4 100644
+--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
++++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/resource.h>
+
+ #define GRUBENV "/" GRUB_BOOT_DIR_NAME "/" GRUB_DIR_NAME "/" GRUB_ENVBLK_DEFCFG
+ #define GRUBENV_SIZE 1024
+@@ -54,12 +56,17 @@ static void usage(void)
+ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+ /* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
+- char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1], buf[64], *s;
++ char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
+ /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
+ char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
+ const char *bootflag;
+ int i, fd, len, ret;
+ FILE *f;
++ struct rlimit rlim;
++
++ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
++ return 1;
++ umask(077);
+
+ if (argc != 2)
+ {
+@@ -81,20 +88,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ len = strlen (bootflag);
+
+ /*
+- * Really become root. setuid avoids an user killing us, possibly leaking
+- * the tmpfile. setgid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
++ * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
+ */
+- ret = setuid(0);
+- if (ret)
+- {
+- perror ("Error setuid(0) failed");
+- return 1;
+- }
+-
+- ret = setgid(0);
+- if (ret)
++ if (setegid(0))
+ {
+- perror ("Error setgid(0) failed");
++ perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -123,6 +121,9 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+
+ /* 0 terminate env */
+ env[GRUBENV_SIZE] = 0;
++ /* not a valid flag value */
++ env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1] = 0;
++ env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 2] = 0;
+
+ if (strncmp (env, GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE, strlen (GRUB_ENVBLK_SIGNATURE)))
+ {
+@@ -158,6 +159,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+
+ /* The grubenv is not 0 terminated, so memcpy the name + '=' , '1', '\n' */
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s=1\n", bootflag);
++ if (!memcmp(s, buf, len + 3))
++ return 0; /* nothing to do */
+ memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
+
+
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch b/SOURCES/0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a7416c1a780b295e38cb241436891543f5ed944d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+From f4c7783c2b695794938748a6567e86456ed2314a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 21:56:21 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/3] grub-set-bootflag: More complete fix for CVE-2024-1048
+
+Switch to per-user fixed temporary filenames along with a weird locking
+mechanism, which is explained in source code comments. This is a more
+complete fix than the previous commit (temporary files can't accumulate).
+Unfortunately, it introduces new risks (by working on a temporary file
+shared between the user's invocations), which are _hopefully_ avoided by
+the patch's elaborate logic. I actually got it wrong at first, which
+suggests that this logic is hard to reason about, and more errors or
+omissions are possible. It also relies on the kernel's primitives' exact
+semantics to a greater extent (nothing out of the ordinary, though).
+
+Remaining issues that I think cannot reasonably be fixed without a
+redesign (e.g., having per-flag files with nothing else in them) and
+without introducing new issues:
+
+A. A user can still revert a concurrent user's attempt of setting the
+other flag - or of making other changes to grubenv by means other than
+this program.
+
+B. One leftover temporary file per user is still possible.
+
+Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+---
+ util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+index 5b932f76b6f4..698b55a1ab93 100644
+--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
++++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <sys/file.h>
+ #include <sys/stat.h>
+ #include <sys/resource.h>
+
+@@ -57,15 +58,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ {
+ /* NOTE buf must be at least the longest bootflag length + 4 bytes */
+ char env[GRUBENV_SIZE + 1 + 2], buf[64], *s;
+- /* +1 for 0 termination, +6 for "XXXXXX" in tmp filename */
+- char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 6 + 1];
++ /* +1 for 0 termination, +11 for ".%u" in tmp filename */
++ char env_filename[PATH_MAX + 1], tmp_filename[PATH_MAX + 11 + 1];
+ const char *bootflag;
+ int i, fd, len, ret;
+ FILE *f;
+- struct rlimit rlim;
+
+- if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
+- return 1;
+ umask(077);
+
+ if (argc != 2)
+@@ -92,7 +90,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ */
+ if (setegid(0))
+ {
+- perror ("Error setegid(0) failed");
++ perror ("setegid(0) failed");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -163,19 +161,82 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ return 0; /* nothing to do */
+ memcpy(s, buf, len + 3);
+
++ struct rlimit rlim;
++ if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlim) || rlim.rlim_cur < GRUBENV_SIZE || rlim.rlim_max < GRUBENV_SIZE)
++ {
++ fprintf (stderr, "Resource limits undetermined or too low\n");
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Here we work under the premise that we shouldn't write into the target
++ * file directly because we might not be able to have all of our changes
++ * written completely and atomically. That was CVE-2019-14865, known to
++ * have been triggerable via RLIMIT_FSIZE. While we've dealt with that
++ * specific attack via the check above, there may be other possibilities.
++ */
+
+ /*
+ * Create a tempfile for writing the new env. Use the canonicalized filename
+ * for the template so that the tmpfile is in the same dir / on same fs.
++ *
++ * We now use per-user fixed temporary filenames, so that a user cannot cause
++ * multiple files to accumulate.
++ *
++ * We don't use O_EXCL so that a stale temporary file doesn't prevent further
++ * usage of the program by the user.
+ */
+- snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%sXXXXXX", env_filename);
+- fd = mkstemp(tmp_filename);
++ snprintf(tmp_filename, sizeof(tmp_filename), "%s.%u", env_filename, getuid());
++ fd = open(tmp_filename, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600);
+ if (fd == -1)
+ {
+ perror ("Creating tmpfile failed");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * The lock prevents the same user from reaching further steps ending in
++ * rename() concurrently, in which case the temporary file only partially
++ * written by one invocation could be renamed to the target file by another.
++ *
++ * The lock also guards the slow fsync() from concurrent calls. After the
++ * first time that and the rename() complete, further invocations for the
++ * same flag become no-ops.
++ *
++ * We lock the temporary file rather than the target file because locking the
++ * latter would allow any user having SIGSTOP'ed their process to make all
++ * other users' invocations fail (or lock up if we'd use blocking mode).
++ *
++ * We use non-blocking mode (LOCK_NB) because the lock having been taken by
++ * another process implies that the other process would normally have already
++ * renamed the file to target by the time it releases the lock (and we could
++ * acquire it), so we'd be working directly on the target if we proceeded,
++ * which is undesirable, and we'd kind of fail on the already-done rename.
++ */
++ if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB))
++ {
++ perror ("Locking tmpfile failed");
++ return 1;
++ }
++
++ /*
++ * Deal with the potential that another invocation proceeded all the way to
++ * rename() and process exit while we were between open() and flock().
++ */
++ {
++ struct stat st1, st2;
++ if (fstat(fd, &st1) || stat(tmp_filename, &st2))
++ {
++ perror ("stat of tmpfile failed");
++ return 1;
++ }
++ if (st1.st_dev != st2.st_dev || st1.st_ino != st2.st_ino)
++ {
++ fprintf (stderr, "Another invocation won race\n");
++ return 1;
++ }
++ }
++
+ f = fdopen (fd, "w");
+ if (!f)
+ {
+@@ -200,23 +261,25 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+- ret = fsync (fileno (f));
++ ret = ftruncate (fileno (f), GRUBENV_SIZE);
+ if (ret)
+ {
+- perror ("Error syncing tmpfile");
++ perror ("Error truncating tmpfile");
+ unlink(tmp_filename);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+- ret = fclose (f);
++ ret = fsync (fileno (f));
+ if (ret)
+ {
+- perror ("Error closing tmpfile");
++ perror ("Error syncing tmpfile");
+ unlink(tmp_filename);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
++ * We must not close the file before rename() as that would remove the lock.
++ *
+ * And finally rename the tmpfile with the new env over the old env, the
+ * linux kernel guarantees that this is atomic (from a syscall pov).
+ */
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch b/SOURCES/0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3e13dfcdda5ebd7e0400c12bf24d1e13c272af5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From a7192a650c1e94221a86b49f5132fb47a4dda6ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 22:05:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] grub-set-bootflag: Exit calmly when not running as root
+
+Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root. This
+allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
+supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
+
+Signed-off-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
+---
+ util/grub-set-bootflag.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+index 698b55a1ab93..a51805fa8cec 100644
+--- a/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
++++ b/util/grub-set-bootflag.c
+@@ -85,6 +85,17 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+ bootflag = bootflags[i];
+ len = strlen (bootflag);
+
++ /*
++ * Exit calmly when not installed SUID root and invoked by non-root. This
++ * allows installing user/grub-boot-success.service unconditionally while
++ * supporting non-SUID installation of the program for some limited usage.
++ */
++ if (geteuid())
++ {
++ printf ("grub-set-bootflag not running as root, no action taken\n");
++ return 0;
++ }
++
+ /*
+ * setegid avoids the new grubenv's gid being that of the user.
+ */
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch b/SOURCES/0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..8234f678acd863538d6bc57de1aee40a92d1776f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+From 43651027d24e62a7a463254165e1e46e42aecdea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:31:57 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the
+ $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute for the $MFT file
+
+When parsing an extremely fragmented $MFT file, i.e., the file described
+using the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute, current NTFS code will reuse a buffer
+containing bytes read from the underlying drive to store sector numbers,
+which are consumed later to read data from these sectors into another buffer.
+
+These sectors numbers, two 32-bit integers, are always stored at predefined
+offsets, 0x10 and 0x14, relative to first byte of the selected entry within
+the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute. Usually, this won't cause any problem.
+
+However, when parsing a specially-crafted file system image, this may cause
+the NTFS code to write these integers beyond the buffer boundary, likely
+causing the GRUB memory allocator to misbehave or fail. These integers contain
+values which are controlled by on-disk structures of the NTFS file system.
+
+Such modification and resulting misbehavior may touch a memory range not
+assigned to the GRUB and owned by firmware or another EFI application/driver.
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that these sector numbers are never
+written beyond the boundary.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-4692
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index bbdbe24ada83..c3c4db117bba 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ }
+ if (at->attr_end)
+ {
+- grub_uint8_t *pa;
++ grub_uint8_t *pa, *pa_end;
+
+ at->emft_buf = grub_malloc (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+ if (at->emft_buf == NULL)
+@@ -209,11 +209,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ }
+ at->attr_nxt = at->edat_buf;
+ at->attr_end = at->edat_buf + u32at (pa, 0x30);
++ pa_end = at->edat_buf + n;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
+ at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
++ pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+ }
+ at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST;
+ while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
+@@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS;
+ at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt;
+ pa = at->attr_cur;
++
++ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
+ grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x10,
+ grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start));
+ grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x14,
+@@ -240,6 +249,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ {
+ if (*pa != attr)
+ break;
++
++ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
+ if (read_attr
+ (at, pa + 0x10,
+ u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch b/SOURCES/0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a90e077ee3f87e110f733ecf33622e69e0c4f00f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From 0ed2458cc4eff6d9a9199527e2a0b6d445802f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the
+ resident $DATA attribute
+
+When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in
+the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters,
+there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding
+file record segment.
+
+When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will
+read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of
+arbitrary, attacker-chosen length.
+
+This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could
+contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text,
+obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables.
+
+This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the
+corresponding file record segment only.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2023-4693
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index c3c4db117bba..a68e173d8285 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
+ {
+ if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
+- grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
++
++ if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
++
++ if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
++
++ if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
++ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
++
++ grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch b/SOURCES/0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fb3eb315347898c3a8c973e9294ad8b3bf11f05c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 7e5f031a6a6a3decc2360a7b0c71abbe598e7354 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:17 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing directory entries
+ from resident and non-resident index attributes
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that index entries are never read
+beyond the corresponding directory index.
+
+The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 +++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index a68e173d8285..2d78b96e19fb 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ get_utf8 (grub_uint8_t *in, grub_size_t len)
+ }
+
+ static int
+-list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
++list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos, grub_uint8_t *end_pos,
+ grub_fshelp_iterate_dir_hook_t hook, void *hook_data)
+ {
+ grub_uint8_t *np;
+@@ -610,6 +610,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
+ grub_uint8_t namespace;
+ char *ustr;
+
++ if ((pos >= end_pos) || (end_pos - pos < 0x52))
++ break;
++
+ if (pos[0xC] & 2) /* end signature */
+ break;
+
+@@ -617,6 +620,9 @@ list_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *diro, grub_uint8_t *pos,
+ ns = *(np++);
+ namespace = *(np++);
+
++ if (2 * ns > end_pos - pos - 0x52)
++ break;
++
+ /*
+ * Ignore files in DOS namespace, as they will reappear as Win32
+ * names.
+@@ -806,7 +812,9 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ }
+
+ cur_pos += 0x10; /* Skip index root */
+- ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0), hook, hook_data);
++ ret = list_file (mft, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0),
++ at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
++ hook, hook_data);
+ if (ret)
+ goto done;
+
+@@ -893,6 +901,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ (const grub_uint8_t *) "INDX")))
+ goto done;
+ ret = list_file (mft, &indx[0x18 + u16at (indx, 0x18)],
++ indx + (mft->data->idx_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
+ hook, hook_data);
+ if (ret)
+ goto done;
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch b/SOURCES/0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c121cf3dec93f7632d3d63ba238f342687202330
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From 7a5a116739fa6d8a625da7d6b9272c9a2462f967 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:33:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing bitmaps for index
+ attributes
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that bitmaps for directory indices
+are never read beyond their actual sizes.
+
+The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not exploitable in any way.
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index 2d78b96e19fb..bb70c89fb803 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -843,6 +843,25 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+
+ if (is_resident)
+ {
++ if (bitmap_len > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap too large");
++ goto done;
++ }
++
++ if (cur_pos >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
++ goto done;
++ }
++
++ if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
++ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
++ goto done;
++ }
++
+ grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
+ bitmap_len);
+ }
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch b/SOURCES/0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..efeb21d4319296e47f0bba0f6e3fc4213a8eca9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 1fe82c41e070385e273d7bb1cfb482627a3c28e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:38:19 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when parsing a volume label
+
+This fix introduces checks to ensure that an NTFS volume label is always
+read from the corresponding file record segment.
+
+The current NTFS code allows the volume label string to be read from an
+arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory location. However, the bytes read are
+always treated as UTF-16LE. So, the final string displayed is mostly
+unreadable and it can't be easily converted back to raw bytes.
+
+The lack of this check is a minor issue, likely not causing a significant
+data leak.
+
+Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index bb70c89fb803..ff5e3740f0dd 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -1213,13 +1213,29 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
+
+ init_attr (&mft->attr, mft);
+ pa = find_attr (&mft->attr, GRUB_NTFS_AT_VOLUME_NAME);
++
++ if (pa >= mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
++ goto fail;
++ }
++
++ if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa < 0x16)
++ {
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
++ goto fail;
++ }
++
+ if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
+ {
+ int len;
+
+ len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
+ pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
+- *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
++ if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
++ *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
++ else
++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse volume label");
+ }
+
+ fail:
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch b/SOURCES/0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2f00384e9a5db4382161b4b73534159ccf0835fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+From e58b870ff926415e23fc386af41ff81b2f588763 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:40:07 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fs/ntfs: Make code more readable
+
+Move some calls used to access NTFS attribute header fields into
+functions with human-readable names.
+
+Suggested-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+index ff5e3740f0dd..de435aa14d85 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,24 @@ u64at (void *ptr, grub_size_t ofs)
+ return grub_le_to_cpu64 (grub_get_unaligned64 ((char *) ptr + ofs));
+ }
+
++static grub_uint16_t
++first_attr_off (void *mft_buf_ptr)
++{
++ return u16at (mft_buf_ptr, 0x14);
++}
++
++static grub_uint16_t
++res_attr_data_off (void *res_attr_ptr)
++{
++ return u16at (res_attr_ptr, 0x14);
++}
++
++static grub_uint32_t
++res_attr_data_len (void *res_attr_ptr)
++{
++ return u32at (res_attr_ptr, 0x10);
++}
++
+ grub_ntfscomp_func_t grub_ntfscomp_func;
+
+ static grub_err_t
+@@ -106,7 +124,7 @@ init_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft)
+ {
+ at->mft = mft;
+ at->flags = (mft == &mft->data->mmft) ? GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT : 0;
+- at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + u16at (mft->buf, 0x14);
++ at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + first_attr_off (mft->buf);
+ at->attr_end = at->emft_buf = at->edat_buf = at->sbuf = NULL;
+ }
+
+@@ -154,7 +172,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+- new_pos = &at->emft_buf[u16at (at->emft_buf, 0x14)];
++ new_pos = &at->emft_buf[first_attr_off (at->emft_buf)];
+ while (*new_pos != 0xFF)
+ {
+ if ((*new_pos == *at->attr_cur)
+@@ -213,7 +231,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
+ }
+ else
+ {
+- at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
++ at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + res_attr_data_off (pa);
+ at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
+ pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
+ }
+@@ -399,20 +417,20 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
+
+ if (pa[8] == 0)
+ {
+- if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
++ if (ofs + len > res_attr_data_len (pa))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
+
+- if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
++ if (res_attr_data_len (pa) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
+
+ if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
+
+- if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
++ if (res_attr_data_off (pa) + res_attr_data_len (pa) >
+ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
+
+- grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
++ grub_memcpy (dest, pa + res_attr_data_off (pa) + ofs, len);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -556,7 +574,7 @@ init_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *mft, grub_uint64_t mftno)
+ (unsigned long long) mftno);
+
+ if (!pa[8])
+- mft->size = u32at (pa, 0x10);
++ mft->size = res_attr_data_len (pa);
+ else
+ mft->size = u64at (pa, 0x30);
+
+@@ -805,7 +823,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ (u32at (cur_pos, 0x18) != 0x490024) ||
+ (u32at (cur_pos, 0x1C) != 0x300033))
+ continue;
+- cur_pos += u16at (cur_pos, 0x14);
++ cur_pos += res_attr_data_off (cur_pos);
+ if (*cur_pos != 0x30) /* Not filename index */
+ continue;
+ break;
+@@ -834,7 +852,7 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ {
+ int is_resident = (cur_pos[8] == 0);
+
+- bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) :
++ bitmap_len = ((is_resident) ? res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) :
+ u32at (cur_pos, 0x28));
+
+ bmp = grub_malloc (bitmap_len);
+@@ -855,14 +873,14 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+- if (u16at (cur_pos, 0x14) + u32at (cur_pos, 0x10) >
++ if (res_attr_data_off (cur_pos) + res_attr_data_len (cur_pos) >
+ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) cur_pos)
+ {
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident bitmap out of range");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+- grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + u16at (cur_pos, 0x14),
++ grub_memcpy (bmp, cur_pos + res_attr_data_off (cur_pos),
+ bitmap_len);
+ }
+ else
+@@ -1226,12 +1244,12 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+- if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (u32at (pa, 0x10)))
++ if ((pa) && (pa[8] == 0) && (res_attr_data_len (pa)))
+ {
+ int len;
+
+- len = u32at (pa, 0x10) / 2;
+- pa += u16at (pa, 0x14);
++ len = res_attr_data_len (pa) / 2;
++ pa += res_attr_data_off (pa);
+ if (mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - pa >= 2 * len)
+ *label = get_utf8 (pa, len);
+ else
+--
+2.43.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/20-grub.install b/SOURCES/20-grub.install
index 9b74538c576daefc20ae2fc5209ba49c78c87add..dd2018aa31cb682be5082413bb7d12529bee441d 100755
--- a/SOURCES/20-grub.install
+++ b/SOURCES/20-grub.install
@@ -109,7 +109,11 @@ case "$COMMAND" in
sed -i -e "s,^initrd.*,initrd ${BOOTPREFIX}${INITRD},g" "${BLS_TARGET}"
fi
- if [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" == *\+* ]] && [ "x$GRUB_DEFAULT_TO_DEBUG" != "xtrue" ]; then
+ if ( [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" != *${GRUB_DEFAULT_KERNEL_TYPE}* ]] && \
+ [ "x$GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL" == "xtrue" ] ) || \
+ ( echo "$KERNEL_VERSION" | grep -E -q "64k|auto|rt|uki" && \
+ [ "x$GRUB_NON_STANDARD_KERNEL" != "xtrue" ] ) || \
+ ( [[ "$KERNEL_VERSION" == *debug* ]] && [ "x$GRUB_DEFAULT_TO_DEBUG" != "xtrue" ] ); then
GRUB_UPDATE_DEFAULT_KERNEL=false
fi
diff --git a/SOURCES/grub.patches b/SOURCES/grub.patches
index 3bb7067f5b3115a6d1ef67874ba8e71badb6611f..505a35f66f7ef6cecefa8bde2c202f92abe9d818 100644
--- a/SOURCES/grub.patches
+++ b/SOURCES/grub.patches
@@ -576,3 +576,15 @@ Patch0575: 0575-Enable-shared-processor-mode-in-vector-5.patch
Patch0576: 0576-efi-http-change-uint32_t-to-uintn_t-for-grub_efi_htt.patch
Patch0577: 0577-ieee1275-Converting-plain-numbers-to-constants-in-Ve.patch
Patch0578: 0578-ieee1275-extended-support-in-options-vector5.patch
+Patch0579: 0579-Regenerate-kernelopts-if-missing-on-ppc.patch
+Patch0580: 0580-kern-ieee1275-init-ppc64-Restrict-high-memory-in-pre.patch
+Patch0581: 0581-util-Enable-default-kernel-for-updates.patch
+Patch0582: 0582-grub-set-bootflag-Conservative-partial-fix-for-CVE-2.patch
+Patch0583: 0583-grub-set-bootflag-More-complete-fix-for-CVE-2024-104.patch
+Patch0584: 0584-grub-set-bootflag-Exit-calmly-when-not-running-as-ro.patch
+Patch0585: 0585-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch
+Patch0586: 0586-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch
+Patch0587: 0587-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-directory-entri.patch
+Patch0588: 0588-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-bitmaps-for-ind.patch
+Patch0589: 0589-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-parsing-a-volume-label.patch
+Patch0590: 0590-fs-ntfs-Make-code-more-readable.patch
diff --git a/SPECS/grub2.spec b/SPECS/grub2.spec
index f048a143e11502a666b71d2ba13d0a09d83db402..04115cdb5171ffcad637dcd72bc8a31950355135 100644
--- a/SPECS/grub2.spec
+++ b/SPECS/grub2.spec
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
Name: grub2
Epoch: 1
Version: 2.02
-Release: 150%{?dist}.rocky.0.3
+Release: 156%{?dist}.rocky.0.1
Summary: Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more
Group: System Environment/Base
License: GPLv3+
@@ -512,14 +512,41 @@ fi
%endif
%changelog
-* Thu Apr 04 2024 Release Engineering <releng@rockylinux.org> - 2.02-150.rocky.0.3
+* Wed May 22 2024 Release Engineering <releng@rockylinux.org> - 2.02-156.rocky.0.1
- Removing redhat old cert sources entries (Sherif Nagy)
- Preserving rhel8 sbat entry based on shim-review feedback ticket no. 194
-- Porting to 8.9
+- Porting to 8.10
- Cleaning up grup.macro extra signing certs and updating rocky test CA and CERT
- Cleaning up grup.macro extra signing certs
- Use rocky-sb-certs for secure boot signing
+* Tue Feb 20 2024 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-156
+- fs/ntfs: OOB write fix
+- (CVE-2023-4692)
+- Resolves: #RHEL-11566
+
+* Thu Feb 8 2024 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.06-155
+- grub-set-bootflag: Fix for CVE-2024-1048
+- (CVE-2024-1048)
+- Resolves: #RHEL-20746
+
+* Mon Nov 27 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-154
+- Missing install script for previous commit
+- Related: #RHEL-4343
+
+* Fri Nov 24 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-153
+- util: Enable default kernel for updates
+- Resolves: #RHEL-4343
+
+* Fri Oct 20 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-152
+- kern/ieee1275/init: ppc64: Restrict high memory in presence
+ of fadump
+- Resolves: #RHEL-14283
+
+* Mon Aug 28 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-151
+- util: Regenerate kernelopts if missing on ppc
+- Resolves: #2051889
+
* Fri Jun 16 2023 Nicolas Frayer <nfrayer@redhat.com> - 2.02-150
- kern/ieee1275/init: sync vec5 patchset with upstream
- Resolves: #2172111